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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KING BROS., INC., a corporation

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 9626

UTAH DRY KILN COMPANY, INC.
a. corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought under Sections 14-2-1 and
14-2-2, Utah Code, Ann. 1953, which is the private contracts or bond statute of our Code.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the Lower Court a complaint was filed and a motion. to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was
filed by the defendant. Oral Arguments on this motion
\Vere heard by the lower court and the parties submitted
briefs. On January 15, 1962 the lower court sustained the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the Order
of the Lower Court dismissing the complaint, and to permit the case to be heard on its merits.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case was never tried below and of course the
only facts with which we are concerned are the allegations of the complaint which, for the purpose of this appeal, must be taken as true. As stated above this is an
action under our· private contractor's statute or bond
statute, being Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, Utah Code. The
plaintiff-appellant is the supplier of materials and the
defendent-respondent is the owner of the property involved.
The complaint alleges that between October 15, 1959
and 23, 1959 the appellant supplied to the Oregon Dryer
Company lumber dry kiln equipment for installation in
a dry kiln of the defendant's at Panguitch, Utah, and at
the request of the Oregon Dryer Company, this equipment
was shipped direct to the job site at Panguitch, Utah by
the plaintiff. The Oregon Dryer Company was the contractor to build the dry kiln for the defendant. The total
selling price of this equipment was $2,692.00 for which
the plaintiff was never paid. The complaint further alleges that this equipment was in fact installed on the
property of the defendant at Panguitch, Utah and is in
use by said defendant.
The second cause of action alleges that on or about
October 27, 1959, the assignor of the plaintiff sold and
supplied to Oregon Dryer Company as contractor additional dry kiln equipment of a value of $1463.19 which
was likewise shipped by the supplier direct to the job
site at Panguitch, Utah and was installed in the dry kiln
and is being used by the defendant. The claim for this
equipme·nt was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff.
The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff was
not paid for this equipment supplied and that the value
of the equipment was more than $500.00 and that the defendant, as the owner of the prop·erty had not secured a
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bond and therefore, the defendant is liable under Section
14-2-2, Utah Code.
It should be stated at the outset that the plaintiff
feels that the complaint possibly should be amended. At
the oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and also in
the Brief filed by plaintiff in the lower court, the plaintiff requested permission to amend the complaint if it
was felt that the complaint did not sufficiently allege
that the equipment sued for was an improvement to defendant's land. The lower court, however, conceding that
any such deficiencies could be supplied by amendment,
ruled summarily on the merits by holding that the equipment in question was not "an improvement on the land"
within the meaning of the statute relied upon.

ARGUMENT
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO RULE, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE EQUIPMENT SUED
FOR WAS NOT USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION, ADDITION TO ALTERATION, OR REPAIR OF ANY
BUILDING, STRUCTURE OR IMPROVEMENT UPON
LAND~

For the purpose of this argument and because there
is no evidence before the court, it may be ·oecessary to
explain in a simple way what the dry kilning equipment
consisted of and how it works. In order to cure and dry
lumber, it is necessary that great quantities of heat be
:,upnlied. The equipment herein sued for consisted of a
la~:ge iron or steel furnace, the duct work leading from
the furnace to large blowers run by fans and electric
motors. These fans suck the heat from the furnace and
blow it over and through the green or uncured lumber.
In other words, the principle of operation is almost exactly the same as a hot blast furnace in a home or building, operated by natural gas, oil or other fuel. Although
evidentiary, this furnace, duct work, blower fans and
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motors are securely fastened to the building and are part
of it the same way as is a home furnace.
It is the contention of the Plaintiff-appellant that if
the improvement was lienable under our lien laws, then
it was also such an improvement as would come within
the provisions of the private contracts statute herein relied upon. In fact these two statutes use almost identical
language. Section 14-2-1 provides as follows:

"The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for the constructi.on, addition to, or alteration or repair of any building, structure or improvement upon land shall, before any such
work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond
in a sum equal to the contract price, with good and
sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material
furnished and labor performed under the contract.
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who
has furnished rna terials or performed labor for or upon any such building, structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall have a direct
right of action against the sureties upon such bond for
the reasonable value of the materials furnished or
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case
the prices agreed upon."
Section 14-2-2 provides as follows:
"Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond
. . . . . . shall be personally liable to all persons who
have furnished materials or perfonned labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in
any case the prices agreed upon."
Our Mechanics Lien law, being Section 38-1-3 pro-
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vides as follows:
"Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons performing labor upon or furnishing materials to be used in
the construction or alteration of or addition to, or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon
land; all foundry men and boiler makers . . . . . shall
have a lien upon the property ....... "
'
It will be noted that the clause in each of said statutes which is in bold type are in practically identical
language. In fact one leading Utah case, Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke, 167 Pac. 241 stated that the bond
statute was an auxiliary to the Mecha-nics Lien Law and
is just as much a part of it as if it had been incorporated
into the Mechanics Lien Law, as it has in the State of California. In fact the latest case out of the Supreme Court
having to do with the private contractors statute, Crane
Co., vs. Utah Motor Park, 335 Pac. 2d, 837 definitely
shows that this statute is an auxiliary to our Mechanics
Lien Law. Therefore, anything which is lienable under
the Mechanics Lien law would be an improvement to land
within the terms of the contractors or bond statute. Although furnaces aqd heating systems are not expressly
mentioned under the lien law, unless they are included under the terms "foundry men and boiler makers," no one
seriously doubts the right of a supplier of a furnace in a
building or home, or a plumber installing plumbing fixtures, to claim a lien. The reason they are given the right
to file a lien is because their materials have become incorporated into the home or building as a fixture and become part of the realty and have lost their identity as personal property and unless the supplier is able to claim a
lien on the real property, he would have a difficult, if
not an impossible job of following his material in order
to require payment. When the materials have been built
into the structure and are an integral part of it as a
fixture within the accepted rules laid down by the law
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of fixtures, then they are an improvement upon land for
which the supplier can file a Mechanics lien or sue under
the contractors statute. It is the contention of the APpellant that the equipment supplied here became an inegral part of the building and was incorporated into it so
as to become a fixture as a part of the realty and that a
trial of the case would so show.
It is elementary that our lien law does not apply to
chattels or personal property installed in a building
which do not become attached to it or become fixtures
and therefore, ·we must turn to the law of fixtures to see
what is classed as such and what retains its status as
personal property. On the subject of fixtures, 22 Am.
Jur. page 713 provides as follows:

"Fixtures are a species of property which lies along
the dividing line between real and personal property,
and to decide on which side of the line certain items
of property belong is often a difficult question. While
there are differences of opinion as to the precise meaning of the term "fixture," it is generally used in reference to some originally personal chattel which has
been actually or constructively affixed either to the
soil itself or to some structure legally a part of such
soil. It implies having possible existence apart from the
realty but which may by annexation be assimilated
into realty."
This same authority then goes on to state the various rules for determining what are fixtures, one of which
is annexation to the realty and hvo, adaptation or application to the use or purpose to which that part of the
realty to which it is connected is appropriated, and three,
intention to make the article a permanent accession to
the freehold. 22 Am. Jr. pages 763 to 794 gives specific
application of these rules to various items of property
which are and are not fixtures and although the intention of the parties is given much weight, generally heat-
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ing systems, hot water heaters, refrigeration systems,
filling station equipment and plumbing appliances are
classed as fixtures as are ~ ttached boilers and engines
and machinery.
The books are literally full of cases stating what become fixtures and a part of the realty. The following are
cited:
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. vs. Kimball, 94 Pac. 2d, 1101
(Ore) held that where entire dehydration plant, including building, scales, motors, trays, trucks, furnace,
etc. and buried oil tank and other machinery. was bolt·
ed on, including motors and fa·ns, they became fixtures.
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. vs. Hawthorne, 150
Pac. 2d, 55 (Wash.) held that electrical wiring and accessories and appliances used in connection, whether
unprotected or in conduit which were attached to building, were part of the building, and subject to lien.
Dawson vs. Scruggs-Vandervoort Barney Realty Co.
268 Pac. 584 held that a refrigeration plant connected
with the freehold by brine pipes and brackets held
part of the freehold so as to entitle one furnishing new
brine pipes to file a lien.
Lanier vs. Lovett, 213 Pac. 391 held that rna terial used
in a plumbing job is understood in general way to mean
such articles as gas, sewer and water pipes, sinks, bathtubs, etc., as articles for which mechanics lien could
be filed.
Michael vs. Reeves, 60 Pac. 577 held that a furnace in
home was lienable if affixed to the buildings, otherwise
not.
Independent Meat Co. vs. Jerome and Crane Co. 184
Pac. 992 held that to come within the statute so as to
permit the claiming of a lien for machinery furnished
it must appear that the same became part of the con-
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struction, erection or completion of the improvements
and became fixtures to the realty or machinery necessary in accomplishing the construction· of the improveme·nt.
The Utah case of Moe vs. Millard County School Dist.
179 Pac. 980 which held that plumbing, heating and
ventilating equipment installed in a school became fixtures.
Probably the last pronouncement from the Utah
Supreme Court on this subject was the case of Crane Co.
vs. Utah Motor Park, ·supra. There a new boiler was installed, no bond was supplied by the owner and the supplier of. the boiler sued under the private contractor's
statute. Although not specifically raised, it appears to
have been conceded that this was a fixture and therefore H.enable and therefore within the terms also of the
private contractors stat1,1te. True, one of the latest cases
from the Utah Supreme Court was the case of Backus vs.
Hooten, 294 Pac. 2d 703, wherein it was held that
the leveling of land was not such an improvement upon
land within the terms of the statute. But ariother recent
case out of our Supreme Court is that of Stanton Transportation Co. vs Davis, 341 Pac. 2d, 209 where it was held
under our Mechanics Lien Law, transportation charges of
an oil rig. could not be claimed but work in erecting the
rig on the property could be.
In order to determine whether the equipment herein
involved became fixtures it would be necessary to try
the case; . the finding of which .on this particular point,
the appellant has nothing to fear but for the lower court
to summarily decide this question, as a matter of law, decides the case on its merits without regard as to whether
or not they have become fixtures and thus an improvement "upon land." It is for this reason it was error for
the lower court to so summarily decide this case. The
lower court has ruled that installation of this lumber dry-
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ing and curing equipment in a lumber kiln was not an
improvement upon the land. In fact the wording of the
lower court's order is sufficiently broad that not even an
installer of a heating, refrigeration or plumbing system
in a home could claim a lien therefor. It is generally conceded, however, that such are lienable improvements.
In summary on this point, it is the Appellant's contention that whatever is lienable comes within the terms
of the private contractor's statute and that the furnishing
of items which become fixtures are improvements to the
land; that the Mechanics Lien Law and the private contractors statute are auxiliary to each other and that this
point has been decided at least twice by our Supreme
Court in the cases of the Rio Grande Lumber Co. vs.
Darke, supra, and Crane Co. vs. Utah Motor Park, supra.
Furthermore, the Utah case of Liberty Coal and Lumber
Co. vs Snow, 178 Pac. 341 holds that the private contracta
ors or bond statute is very broad and sweeping in its
terms.
The purpose of the Mechanics Lien statute and
also the bond statute is to prevent the owners of land
from having their lands improved with materials and labor furnished and performed by third person and thus
enhance the value of such land without becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of the materials
and labor which enhance the value of those lands. Such
will be the exact case here.
POINT 2. THE PRIVATE CONTRACTORS STATUTE
HAS BEEN HELD TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL
The Respondent's memorandum filed in the lower
court and also the Order of the Lower Court dismissing
the ccmplaint touched upon the constitutionality of the
statute involved. In fact the Lower Court appears to rely
upon the unconstitutionality of this statute and its hardship provisions to support its ruling. If should be suffi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
cient to state here that Rio Grande Lumber vs. Darke
case, supra, after a very full and complete exploration
of the constitutionality question, ruled the statute as beil'lg constitutional and this ruling was affirmed in the
Crane Co. vs. Utah Motor Park case above referred to.
Perhaps something should be said regarding the
claimed penal or hardship application of these statutes.
Every owner of property having improvements made
thereon can protect himself by one of two different methods as fully explained by the Darke case. He may require a bond of the contractor to protect against suppliers of labor or materials, or he may hold back sufficient of the contract price to assure that they are paid.
If he does neither but blithely pays the contractor he has
contributed to his own hardship. He has had it in his
power to prevent such a situation and fails to do so. It is
not for him now to come in and cry hardship. In fact
the Court in the Darke case used the apt language of
stating that "under the bond statute he must take care
to exact the bond a·nd underJhe lien statute he must take
care to hold the fund."
·CONCLUSION
Therefore, in conclusion, the Appellant contends that
it is entitled to have this case heard on its merits; that
if upon a trial it is found that the equipment supplied is
now incorporated into the defendant's real property as
fixtures, they are improvements upon the land within
the meaning of the bond statute and that such statutes
have been upheld by our Court and work no undue hardship upon the owner of property.
Respectfully submitted,
ORVILLE ISOM
Attorney for Appellant
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